Bangura v. Elwyn Inc by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-3-2012 
Bangura v. Elwyn Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Bangura v. Elwyn Inc" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 320. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/320 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
GLD-289        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-2716 
 ___________ 
 
 BAKARR BANGURA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ELWYN, INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 2-11-cv-02793) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 20, 2012 
 
 Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and BARRY, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: October 3, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
  Bakarr Bangura appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his amended 
complaint against his former employer Elwyn, Inc. (“Elwyn”).  We will affirm. 
 Bangura filed suit pro se alleging that Elwyn terminated him on the basis of his 
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Senegalese national origin.  Bangura used a form employment discrimination complaint.  
The first page states that “This action is brought for discrimination in employment 
pursuant to (check only those that apply). . . .”  The page then lists four options, including 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
(“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 951-963.  Bangura did not check the options for Title 
VII or any other federal statute and instead checked only the option for the PHRA.   
 Elwyn filed a motion to dismiss Bangura’s complaint on the sole ground that his 
PHRA claim is barred as a matter of state law.  Bangura, in turn, requested counsel.  The 
District Court granted that request, but Bangura later filed a “declination of attorney” and 
elected to respond to Elwyn’s motion pro se.1  The District Court later granted Elwyn’s 
motion and dismissed Bangura’s complaint on the basis of state law.  Bangura appealed, 
and we vacated and remanded because our review did not reveal any basis for the District 
Court to have exercised subject matter jurisdiction.  See Bangura v. Elwyn, Inc., 461 F. 
App’x 87, 88 (3d Cir. 2012).  We explained that Bangura had not invoked Title VII or 
any other federal statute in his complaint, and we directed the District Court to consider 
the basis for its jurisdiction.  See id.
 On remand, the District Court granted Bangura leave to “amend his complaint to 
state a basis for federal jurisdiction[.]”  (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 21.)  In doing so, the court 
referred Bangura to the portion of our opinion discussing the jurisdictional issue, 
   
                                                 
1 Bangura’s declination stated in relevant part:  “This correspondence will confirm that 
you provided me with legal representation . . . and I am opting or wish to decline your 
offer.  This is because I think I can better represent my self [sic] in such a sensitive case.”  
(Dist. Ct. Docket No. 13.) 
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including our discussion of Title VII.  Bangura then filed an amended complaint, which 
was identical to his original complaint except that it omitted his previous factual 
statement and added a prayer for relief.  Once again, Bangura neither checked the box 
pertaining to Title VII or any other federal statute nor mentioned any such statute in the 
amended complaint.  Elwyn filed another motion to dismiss, and Bangura responded with 
two “motions for hearing.”  The first merely requested a hearing on the merits of his 
claim.  The second was identical, except that Bangura included for the first time the 
assertion that “[t]he basis for jurisdiction is employment discrimination based on ethnic 
origin as highlighted in Title VII[.]”  (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 27.)   
 By order entered June 12, 2012, the District Court granted Elwyn’s motion and 
dismissed the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The District 
Court also explained that, if it had jurisdiction, it would have dismissed the amended 
complaint because Bangura did not file his original complaint within 90 days of the date 
on which he alleged he had received a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).  Bangura appeals.2
 Bangura asserts that the District Court had jurisdiction because he brought a claim 
under Title VII, but he raises no argument that the District Court erred in assessing that 
issue and we perceive no such error.  In particular, Bangura does not argue that the 
 
                                                 
2 On the same day that Bangura filed his notice of appeal, he also filed another identical 
“motion for hearing” and a motion for counsel in the District Court.  Those motions 
remain pending.  They do not reference the District Court’s order or otherwise seek 
reconsideration, and their pendency thus does not prevent us from exercising appellate 
jurisdiction, which we have pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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District Court should have construed his second “motion for hearing” as a motion for 
leave to file another amended complaint, and we cannot say that the District Court abused 
its discretion in that regard.  Both we and the District Court specifically advised Bangura 
of the jurisdictional issue and the possibility of asserting a claim under Title VII, but 
Bangura chose not to do so in his amended complaint.  Bangura also did not request leave 
to further amend his complaint, and none of his filings reveals a colorable attempt to 
assert a federal claim.  Pro se filings generally must be liberally construed, but we cannot 
fault the District Court for declining to give Bangura a third opportunity to assert a 
federal claim under these circumstances, particularly after he expressly declined the 
appointment of counsel. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Bangura’s 
amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Because the District Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, its alternative analysis of the merits of the 90-day issue 
is without legal effect.3
                                                 
3 Bangura asserts for the first time on appeal that he instituted a state-court action within 
those 90 days by filing a praecipe for a writ of summons against Elwyn with the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Delaware County.  He has not specified the 
nature or status of that proceeding, but the court’s electronic docket suggests that it 
remains pending.  State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims.  See 
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 826 (1990); Bailey v. Storlazzi, 729 
A.2d 1206, 1209 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (citing Yellow Freight).  Our ruling is thus 
without prejudice to Bangura’s ability to pursue a Title VII claim in state court, though 
we express no opinion on the merits of any such claim or on whether it is otherwise 
proper for him to assert one to the extent he might not already have done so. 
 
